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to choose among various adults, these adopted children understand that 
the most important parent is the one who stays. 
Why not give these children a break? Once a parent enters into a 
child's life, whether by virtue of genes, gestation or declaration, there is 
an unbreakable bond of psychology and history between the two. 
Crispina C., Anna J., Mrs. Moschetta and Mary Beth Whitehead are all 
mothers to their children. Even for those whose parents are absent due 
to contract, abandonment, or involuntary events, there is a mutual tie of 
emotion, of wondering how the other is doing and of moral responsibility. 
While courts and legislatures may see the need to determine who has a 
primary role in raising the child, there is no need to cut these other 
people out entirely. Indeed, from the child's point of view, it is simply 
wrong to do so. It has been said that you can never be too rich or too 
thin. Shall we add, perhaps, that you can never have too many parents 
to love you. 
R. Alta Charo 
Ms. Charo is Assistant Professor of I.Aw and Medical Ethics at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Rule Revision Roundelay 
To the editors: 
The recent resolve of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules to 
revise Rule 11, which the Congress and the Supreme Court revised as 
recently as 1983, is replete with ironies. After only eight years of 
experience with revised Rule 11, and having taken the unusual step of 
issuing an open call for comments before proposing an amendment~ the 
Committee published a preliminary draft of a proposal to revise Rule 11. 
The Committee's proposal skirts most of the problems in implementing 
Rule 11since1983, during which time it had become the most controver-
sial rule revision in the half-century history of the Federal Rules. 
Moreover, were Congress and the Court to adopt the preliminary draft, 
federal litigants, practitioners and judges could experience another decade 
of inconsistent judicial application, satellite litigation and chilling effects. 
The Civil Rules Committee premised its decision to propose 
preliminary amendment partly on the perception that Rule 11 was unduly 
discouraging vigorous advocacy on behalf of particular parties, especially 
civil rights plaintiffs. The reality appears to be that Rule 11 has 
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disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs less than many of the parties 
contended, at least as evidenced by the 1991 Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC) study of Rule 11 and civil rights litigation in five districts that the 
Committee commissioned. Indeed, the 1991 American Judicature Society 
assessment of lawyers' experiences with Rule 11 in the Fifth, Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits suggests that the Rule is more problematic in some forms 
of "ordinary litigation," such as comparatively routine automobile 
accident cases, than in controversial or high profile suits, such as civil 
rights actions. 
In another component of its recent study, FJC circulated a question-
naire to all federal district judges. Eighty percent of those judges who 
replied believed that Rule 11 should be retained essentially intact, even 
though a similar number thought that groundless litigation-the reduction 
of which was a principal purpose for the 1983 revision-is a minor 
problem, and the judges were evenly split over whether such litigation 
had decreased since 1983. A majority of the judges polled also consid-
ered Rule 1 I less effective in managing groundless lawsuits than 
expeditious disposition of Rule 12 motions to dismiss and Rule 56 
motions for summary judgment, Rule 16 pretrial conferences, sanctioning 
under Rules 26 and 37, and informal warnings. The Committee itself 
recently acknowledged that current Rule 11 should not be considered the 
principal means for deterring and controlling groundless motions and 
pleadings, in part because Rule 11 consequences may frustrate the judicial 
process. 
The recent Rule 11 revision efforts of the Civil Rules Committee 
ultimately may please none of the interests that the Rule affects. The 
Committee labored mightily to develop the preliminary draft, commission-
ing the FJC study, soliciting and reading written public comments from 
125 individuals and groups, hearing testimony of sixteen experts at a 
public hearing and conscientiously drafting proposed changes that it 
believed would be responsive to most interests affected by Rule 11. 
For example, the preliminary draft's imposition of a continuing duty 
to withdraw minuscule portions of papers, such as pleadings and motions, 
once they become untenable, and the possibility of incurring large 
monetary sanctions, could chill civil rights plaintiffs and other public 
interest litigation efforts. Although the draft's provision of a safe harbor 
enabling parties to withdraw deficient claims upon notification of their 
insufficiency would afford civil rights plaintiffs and other litigants some 
protection, safe harbors may reinforce one of Rule 11 's worst features, 
its "threat and retreat" aspect. The preliminary draft's 'express inclusion 
of denials as components of pleadings subject to Rule 11 requirements and 
the reduced prospects for recovering monetary sanctions when plaintiffs 
violate the Rule will trouble the defense ~ar. Those provisions and 
others, such . as safe harbors, constitute significant elements of the 
Committee's effort to equalize the burdens that the Rule places on 
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plaintiffs and defendants. How substantially the prescriptions will right 
the current imbalance remains uncertain. For instance, the Committee 
apparently ignored the present disequilibrium ·created by the judicially-
fashioned requirement in every circuit that civil rights plaintiffs plead with 
particularity under Rule 8. Even if the preliminary draft were to impose 
similarly onerous responsibilities on plaintiffs and defendants, the parties 
should have decreased, less onerous, not equally burdensome, obligations. 
The federal judiciary may feel restrained by the explicit provision for 
sanctioning on courts' own initiative and by its decreased discretion, 
especial! y to impose substantial sanctions. Moreover, all interests affected 
by the preliminary draft should be concerned about its considerable latent 
ambiguity and the prospect of ten more years of inconsistent judicial 
enforcement, satellite litigation and potential chilling. The preliminary 
draft replaces relatively clear concepts with ambignous ones. For. 
example, substitution.of the term "nonfrivolous" for "good faith" as the 
adjective modifying the types of legal arguments that would not violate 
the draft's requirements incorporates a concept which courts have 
experienced difficulty applying felicitously. 
The inability to satisfy these affected interests, particularly those as 
disparate as certain members of the federal bench and of the civil rights 
bar, was inherent in the rule revision process. The Committee, in 
attempting to accommodate fairly all relevant interests, may have failed 
to satisfy any of the interests. All interests may attack the preliminary 
draft, albeit from some similar, and certain other diametrically opposed, 
reasons. These interests, if unsuccessful in persuading the Committee or 
subsequent decisionmakers in the rule revision hierarchy to adopt 
perspectives more responsive to viewpoints which they favor, will take 
their case to Congress. Indeed, the Committee's action virtually invites 
those dissatisfied with its work product to seek congressional intervention. 
The reconsideration of Rule 11 is one of the first major experiments 
with procedures for rule revision that Congress prescribed in late 1988, 
ostensibly to improve the process by making it more open to public 
scrutiny. The very openness of these procedures could enable affected 
interests to short-circuit the process by affording them the ammunition 
necessary to make an effective case with Congress. The interests may 
persuade Congress to modify Rule 11 statutorily, despite justifiable 
congressional reluctance to prevent the nascent procedures from running 
their course. If the interests were successful, the new revision process 
eould be perverted before Congress and the Supreme Court have 
sufficient opportunity to ascertain whether it works, while the procedures 
and the Civil Rules Committee might even be casualties of this new 
openness in government. 
There is little need to retain Rule 11 in its present or proposed form. 
The primary problem that led to the 1983 amendment, litigation abuse, 
has been ameliorated. Judges implementing the existing Rule have 
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accomplished several other important purposes underlying revision. Most 
significantly, Rule 11 has prompted many lawyers to conduct reasonable 
inquiries before tiling papers, encouraging them to stop and think before 
they tile and discouraging the pursuit of numerous frivolous cases. 
Although achieving some of these objectives and others has been and is 
important, courts can attain the goals with several effective mechanisms 
that impose fewer costs than Rule 11. Comparatively efficacious 
techniques for deterring abuse of the litigatiori process are civil contempt, 
28 U.S.C. § 1927, and tort causes of action. Moreover, sanctioning 
prescriptions in Rules 16, 26, and 37 address much improper litigation 
behavior that occurs after papers are tiled, thereby reducing the need for 
the onerous continuing duty that the preliminary draft would impose. 
Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S.Ct. 2123 (1991), also enhances the prospects 
for sanctioning abuse with inherent authority, thus decreasing the 
necessity to sanction under Rule 11. Sanctioning pursuant to Rule 11 's 
relatively clear standards, however, may be preferable to sanctioning 
under inherent authority which enhances judicial authority at the expense 
of Congress and litigants. 
Few of these phenomena relating to rule revision are new. Professor 
Judith Resnik observed that the "history of procedure is a series of 
attempts to solve the problems created by the preceding generation's 
procedural reforms" in Tiers, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 1030 (1984). 
Professor Richard Marcus similarly stated, in 1he Revival of Fact 
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 433, 494 (1986), that the cyclical character of procedural change 
in the United States means that those interested in rule reform, "as 
tinkerers . . . will have to repeat the cycle of revision and relapse again 
and again." Indeed, the arresting portrait that be paints of American 
proceduralists eonsigned to a perpetual purgatory in which they tinker 
with proposals to revise the Rules and with the rule revision process 
assumes an almost surreal quality in the form of the Advisory 
Corilmittee's recent efforts to revise Rule 11. 
Carl Tobias 
Mr. Tobias is Professor of Lo.w at the University of Montana. 
